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A CENTURY OLD PROBLEM: FEDERAL OR STATE LAW AS
DETERMINATIVE OF A DIRECTED VERDICT IN A
FEDERAL COURT
S. D. Roberts Moore*
gr-l HE laws of the several states, except where the Constitution
or Treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise
require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions
in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply." ' So states
the commandment by the Congress of the United States which gov-
erns the applicability of state law in all federal civil actions wherein
jurisdiction is founded upon diversity of citizenship.
During the past one hundred years there has been more difficulty
in interpreting this commandment than any other in the field of fed-
eral jurisprudence. 2 Characteristic is the particular problem of whether
the federal court should be guided by a state or federal standard in rul-
ing upon a motion for a directed verdict.
PoLIcY oF FEDERAL JURISDICrION
In 1870 there was a little doubt about the relative positions of fed-
eral and state law in a federal trial based on diversity jurisdiction.
Twenty-eight years earlier, in Swift v. Tyson,s the United States Su-
preme Court declared that "the laws of the several states" did not mean
that federal courts, in matters of general jurisprudence, need apply the
unwritten law of the state as declared by its highest court, and that
federal courts were free to exercise an independent judgment as to what
the common law of the state is, or should be. The court went on to
say that "the laws of the several states" meant:
... state laws strictly local, that is to say, to the positive statutes of
the State, and the construction thereof adopted by the local tribunals,
and to rights and titles to things having a permanent locality, such
* Member of the Virginia Bar. LL.B., Richmond, 1961.
128 U.S.C. § 1652 (1964). The statute is a revision of the Judiciary Act of 1789
in that the phrase "civil actions" was substituted for "trials at common law." See
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 92.
2C. WRIGHT, FEDaRAL CouRTs, § 54, at 187 (1963).
s41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
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as tfe rights and 'tides to real estate, and other matters immovable
and intraterritorial in their nature and character. It has never been
supposed by us that the section did apply, or was designed to apply,
to questions of a more general nature, not at all dependent upon local
statutes or local usages of a fixed and permanent operation, as, for
example, to the construction of ordinary contracts or other written
instruments, and especially to questions of general commercial law,
where the state tribunals are called upon to perform the like functions
as ourselves, that is, to ascertain, upon general reasoning and legal
analogies, . . . what is the just rule furnished by the principles of
commercial law to govern the case.4
In accordance with its stated views, the Court refused to be governed
by New York decisions and reached a conclusion adverse to the con-
clusion demanded from the highest court in New York.
The opinionin Swift v. Tyson was a summation of attitudes and ex-,
pressions that had been felt on the Supreme Court for some thirty years
prior to the date of decision. It is said to have expressed a doctrine that
was "congenial to the jurisprudential climate of the time." 5
It was soon apparent that although Swift v. Tyson concerned itself
with the question of commercial law, the philosophy of federal juris-
prudence announced by Mr. Justice Story would govern the distribu-
tion of power between federal and state courts. Indeed, the federal
courts in their views concerning the -nature of' the law exhibited an
impulse to freedom from the rules that controlled state courts regard-
ing state-created rights.6
The "general law" spoken of in Swift v. Tyson was later
held to include the obligations under contracts entered into and to
be performed within the State, the extent to which a carrier operating
within a State may stipulate for exemption from liability for his
own negligence or that of his employee; the liability for torts com-
mitted within the State upon persons resident or property located
there, even where the question of liability depended upon the scope
of a property right conferred by the State; and the right to exemplary
or punitive damages. Furthermore, state decisions construing local
deeds, mineral conveyances, and even devises of real estate were dis-
regarded .7
4Id. at 18-19.
5 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 102-03 (1945).BId.
7Erie R.R. v. Tompldns, 304 U.S. 64, 75-76 (1938).
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Criticism of the doctrine was scattered" until the Supreme Court de-
cided Black & Tbite Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow
Taxicab & Tansfer Co.' Brown & Yellow, a Kentucky corporation
owned by Kentuckians, had contracted with a railroad for the ex-
clusive right of soliciting passenger and baggage transportation at the
Bowling Green, Kentucky, railroad station. It wanted to enjoin Black
& White, a competing Kentucky corporation, from interfering with
that right. Brown & Yellow knew that such a contract would be de-
clared void under the common law of Kentucky, so it arranged to dis-
solve its Kentucky charter and reincorporate in Tennessee. With its
new found diverse citizenship with Black & White, Brown & Yellow
won its suit for injunctive relief in the federal court. Thereafter, criti-
cism of the Swift v. Tyson doctrine was widespread. 10
The criticism mounted until Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins" was
decided. Here, the Court reconsidered its stated policy of Swift v.
Tyson in deciding whether the law of Pennsylvania or the "general
law" should apply to the claim for damages of Tompkins against the
Erie Railroad Company.
It was noted that experience had revealed the defects, political and
social, in applying the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson. The "mischievous
results of the doctrine had become apparent." 12 Discrimination was
available to non-citizens against citizens because of the choice of two
forums. "In attempting to promote uniformity of law throughout the
United States, the doctrine had prevented uniformity in the adminis-
tration of the law of the State." '"
Against such a background it was declared that thereafter, the law
to be applied by the federal courts in any case where jurisdiction was
based upon diversity of citizenship was the law of the state. Whether
the law of the state was announced by a statute or by a decision from
8 See Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 403 (1893) (dissenting opinion
of Field, J.); Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 370-72 (1910) (dissenting
opinion of Holmes, J.); Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (dis-
senting opinion of Holmes, J.).
9 276 U.S. 518 (1928).
10 See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 73 (1938); Shelton, Concurrent Juris-
diction-Its Necessity and its Dangers, 15 VA. L. REv. 137 (1928); Frankfurter, Dis-
tribution of Judicial Power between Federal and State Courts, 13 CONN. L. Q. 499,
524-30 (1928); Campbell, Is Swift v. Tyson an Argument For or Against Abolishing
Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction?, 18 A.B.A.J. 809 (1932).
11 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
12 Id. at 74.
13 Id. at 75.
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the state's highest court was said not to be a matter of federal concern.
In expressly overruling Swift v. Tyson, the Court stated:
There is no federal general common law. Congress has no power
to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State
whether they be local in their nature or "general," be they com-
mercial law or a part of the law of torts. And no clause in the
Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the federal
CourtS.'
4
Thus, the doctrine "congenial to the jurisprudential climate of the
time" of Swift v. Tyson was dramatically changed. No longer was there
to be "a transcendental body of law outside of any particular State
but obligatory within it unless and until changed by statute . . . ""
Instead, substantive rules of law indicating state policy were to
control the rights of citizens of different states in federal jurisprudence.
Of obvious importance in the dramatic change of thinking was the
problem of forum-shopping so graphically displayed in the Taxicab
case.
A redefinition of the Erie principle was stated six years later in
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York.'0 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for
the Court, recognized the difficulty of distinguishing between matters
of "substance" and matters of "procedure." However, he stated that
"Erie Railroad Co. vu. Tompkins was not an endeavor to formulate
scientific legal terminology. It expressed a policy that touches vitally
the proper distribution of judicial power between state and federal
courts. In essence, the intent of that decision was to insure that, in
all cases where a federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely because
of a diversity of citizenship of the parties, the outcome of the litigation
in the federal court should be substantially the same, so far as legal
rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a
state court. The nub of the policy that underlies Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins is that for the same transaction the accident of a suit by a
non-resident litigant in a federal court instead of in a State court a
block away should not lead to a substantially different result." 17
Thus, it might be said that in the context of determining the dis-
14Id. at 78.
16 Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer
Co., 276 U.S. 518, 532, 533 (1928) (dissenting opinion).
16 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
17 Id. at 109.
1970]
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tribution of powers between state and federal courts, matters of "sub-
stance" are those matters that bear "on a State-created right vitally and
not merely formally or negligibly. As to consequences that so inti-
mately affect recovery or non-recovery a federal court in a diversity
case should follow State law." 18
In Guaranty Trust Co. v. York the Court emphasized that in di-
versity cases the federal court is but another court of the state. The
federal court was to be another tribunal, not another body of law."9
The proper distribution of powers between the state and federal
court again reached the Court in 1958 in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec-
tric Cooperative, Inc. 20 Under consideration was the defense in a negli-
gence action that the plaintiff was the defendant's employee for pur-
poses of the South Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act, and that the
plaintiff's exclusive remedy was under the Act. A decision from the
highest court of South Carolina had held that the judge and not the
jury should decide the validity of such a defense, even in light of con-
flicting evidence. The Supreme Court ruled that in federal actions
based on diversity of citizenship, a jury must decide conflicting evi-
dence, notwithstanding the decision of South Carolina's highest court.
The inquiry of the Court was to the question of ". . . whether the
federal policy favoring jury decisions of disputed fact questions should
yield to the state rule in the interest of furthering the objective that
the litigation should not come out one way in the federal court and
another way in the state court." 21 The Court's answer in favor of
the "federal policy" considers two major premises. First, state rules will
not be allowed to hinder the distribution of trial functions between
judge and jury in the federal courts because of the influence of the
seventh amendment.-2 Secondly, there is no certainty or even strong
possibility that a different result would follow by having a disputed
fact question decided by the jury rather than the judge. The likelihood
of a difference was not thought to be so strong as to require the
"federal policy" to yield to the state rule.
If there was any question, it was decided in Simler v. Conner23 that
18 Id. at 110.
19 Id. at 112. See Angel v. Bulllngton, 330 U.S. 183 (1947).
20 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
21 Id. at 538.
2 2 "In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury
shall be otherwise reexamined in any court of the United States, than according to
the rules of the common law". U.S. CONsr. amend. VII.
23 372 U.S. 221 (1963).
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federal law determined whether a litigant was entitled to a jur:trial,
in a federal diversity action, notwithstanding the fact that Oldah6ma"
decisions had declared that for the subject matter presented, the plaintiff'
was not entitled to a jury trial. The Court declared that the federal
law must apply if the seventh amendment is to have any effect. How-
ever, it was again recognized that the "substantive dimension of the claim
asserted finds its source in state law.... ," 2.
Hanna v. Plumer,25 decided in 1965, fully considers the principles
enunciated in Erie, York, and Byrd. The Court was confronted with
the question of whether Massachusetts law or rule 4(d) (1) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure controlled in a federal court whose
jurisdiction was based upon diversity of citizenship. Massachusetts law
required service of process to be made upon an executor by "delivery
in hand," while rule 4(d) (1) was satisfied by leaving with the executor's
wife at his residence copies of the summons and complaint. If the law
of Massachusetts were followed, the suit would be dismissed. It was
argued that the application of rule 4(d) (1) would "abridge, enlarge,
or modify" a substantive right which was prohibited under the Rules
Enabling Act.20 In deciding that rule 4(d) (1) was controlling, the
Court discussed the proper relationship of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tomp-
kins to Guaranty Trust Co. v. New York. The "outcome-determi-
native" test of York must be considered with the "twin aims of the
Erie rule: discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of in-
equitable administration of the laws." 27 Thus, even though the "out-
come-determinative" test would find Massachusetts law controlling,
so would every procedural variation taken to its ultimate extreme.
Therefore, whether or not the variation between the federal rule and
state law would tend to produce forum-shopping was of primary con-
sideration to the Court.28 The conclusion was reached that even though
24 Id. at 222.
25 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
26"The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe, by general rules, the
forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure of
the district courts of the United States in civil actions.
"Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right and shall
preserve the right of trial by jury... :' 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964).27 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965).
28 See Horowitz, Erie R. R. v. Tompkins-A Test to Determine those Rules of
State Law to 'which Its Doctrine Applies, 23 S. CAL. L. REv. 204, 214-15 (1950), sug-
gesting that the prime consideration for application of the Erie doctrine was whether
adoption of the "federal rule" would more likely than not lead to or encourage forum-
shopping.
f8 7-
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at some stage the variation in procedural rules between federal and
state courts may have some bearing on the outcome, such variation
would not bar or grant a recovery. It was also of signifiance that the
mode of service of process permitted by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure did not alter "the mode of enforcement of state-created
rights in a fashion sufficiently 'substantial' to raise the sort of equal
protection problems to which the Erie opinion alluded." 29
The Court's ultimate decision, however, was based on the philosophy
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should govern federal di-
versity cases. It was said that:
Erie and its offspring cast no doubt on the long-recognized power of
Congress to prescribe housekeeping rules for federal courts even
though some of those rules will inevitably differ from comparable
state rules (citation omitted). "When, because the plaintiff happens
to be a non-resident, such a right is enforceable in a federal as well as
in a State court, the forms and mode of enforcing the right may at
times, naturally enough, vary because the two judicial systems are
not identic" (citations omitted). Thus, though a court, in measuring
a Federal Rule against the standards contained in the Enabling Act
and the Constitution, need not wholly blind itself to the degree to
which the Rule makes the character and result of the federal litigation
stray from the course it would follow in state courts (citation omitted),
it cannot be forgotten that the Erie rule, and the guidelines suggested
in York, were created to serve another purpose altogether. To hold
that a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure must cease to function when-
ever it alters the mode of enforcing state-created rights would be
to disembowel either the Constitution's grant of power over federal
procedure or Congress' attempt to exercise that power in the En-
abling Act.30
As was pointed out in the concurring opinion by Mr. Justice Har-
lan,-" the Court could have reached the same result solely on Erie and
York principles. Indeed, according to Erie and York principles as stated
by the Court, rule 4(d) (1) should have been the standard rather than
the law of Massachusetts.
29 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 469 (1965).
30/Id. at 473-74.
31 Id. at 474-77.
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STATE OR FEDERAL STANDARD TO DETERMINE THE SUFFICIENCY
OF A LITIGANT'S EVIDENCE
The seventh amendment guarantee of a jury trial in federal diversity
cases "was designed to preserve the basic institution of jury trial in its
most fundamental elements." It has been repeatedly held that the
seventh amendment does not deprive federal courts of the power to
direct a verdict for insufficiency of the evidence and the practice was
approved in the promulgation of rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.2
During the typical diversity trial the presiding judge must decide
at the conclusion of one litigant's evidence, upon motion properly made,
whether or not that evidence is sufficient to tend to prove the facts
alleged. In making his decision, should the judge resort to the fed-
eral standard or to the state standard? The appellate courts are divided
on the question,3" and there has been no controlling decision from the
Supreme Court."4
Some courts which have decided that the federal standard is ap-
propriate lean heavily on reasoning that the seventh amendment pro-
vides for jury trials, and, therefore, because a motion for a directed
verdict has to do with the right of jury trial, federal rather than
state law should be applied.35 Other courts lean on the desire for"perpetuation of an independent federal juridical system" coupled with
the finding that "[a] choice of a rule as to the quantum of proof nec-
essary to support the submission of a case to a jury plays no role in the
orderly affairs of anyone." " These views are favored by most of the
commentators.3 7
32 Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 392 (1943).
3 3 See 5 J. MooR, FEDERAL PRACTICE 50.06, at 2348-49 (2d ed. 1969) and cases
cited therein; 2B W. BARRON & A. HoLzzoFF, FEmDER. PRACCE AND PROCEDURE § 871.1
nn. 14.16, 14.17, 14.19 (Wright ed. 1961).
34 Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co, 359 U.S. 437 (1959). The court said: "Lurking
in this case is the question whether it is proper to apply a state or federal test
of sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury verdict where federal jurisdiction is
rested on diversity of citizenship. . . .But the question is not properly here for de-
cision. . . .A decision as to which standard should be applied can well be left to
another case. . . "' id. at 444-45. Mercer v. Theriot, 377 U.S. 152 (1964). But see
Byrd v. Blue Ridge Cooperative, 356 U.S. 525, 540 n. 15 (1958), where Stover v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 464 (1940) was said to have "held that the federal
court should follow the state rule defining the evidence sufficient to raise a jury
question whether the state-created right was established.'
35 See, e.g., Lowry v. Seaboard Airline R.R., 171 F.2d 625 (5th Cir. 1948).
a0 Wratchford v. S. J. Groves & Sons Co., 405 F.2d 1061, 1065-66 (4th Cir. 1969).
37 See 5 J. MOORE, supra note 33, 31.10, at 102 (2d ed. 1969); W. BARRON & A.
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Those courts which have decided that the state standard is ap-
propriate have generally been guided by a finding that the sufficiency
of the evidence goes to the maintenance of the substantive right and is,
therefore, to be tested by state law. 38
A typical example of the problem is shown in Wratchford v. S. ].
Groves & Sons Co.3 9 Wratchford was found at the bottom of an open
highway drainage hole. He was severely injured and could recall none
of the circumstances which led him there. The evidence indicated that
the night before, he was to purchase some groceries on his way home.
His car was found on the side of the road, opposite a motel office where
groceries could be purchased. The drainage hole was approximately
on a line between the motel office and his parked car. His car keys
were found at the bottom of the hole. S. J. Groves & Sons Co. was
the general contractor responsible for the construction of drainage in-
lets at the place of Wratchford's accident. The hole had been cut and
Groves was to supply a grate to be installed by his subcontractor. The
grate had not been been placed when Wratchford fell into the hole.
The accident happened in Maryland but because of Wratchford's
diverse citizenship with Groves, suit was brought in the federal court.
The law of Maryland, which created Wratchford's cause of action,
required that from circumstantial evidence, the jury should not be al-
lowed to draw any inference if one is as probable as the other. The
federal standard for jury submission is that the jury is to resolve con-
flicting inferences from circumstantial evidence. 40 The district court
judge applied the Maryland standard and directed a verdict for
Groves. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, declaring that
the federal law was the correct standard.
No comment is here made as to the relative merits of the separate
standards. The fact is, however, that because of the accident of di-
versity, Wratchford's position was materially changed.
The philosophy prevailing under the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson-
HoLrTzOFF, supra note 33, § 871.1, at 18-19; Note, State Trial Procedures and the Fed-
eral Courts: Evidence, Juries, and Directed Verdicts under the Erie Doctrine, 66
HARV. L. REv. 1516 (1953); Bagalay, Directed Verdicts and the Right to Trial by Jury
in Federal Courts, 42 TEXAs L. REv. 1053 (1964). But see Symposium-Federal Trials
and the Erie Doctrine, 51 Nw. UL. Rev. 338 (1956); Morgan, Choice of Law Gov-
erning Proof, 58 HARv. L. REv. 153 (1944). The literature dealing in some measure
with this subject is voluminous. Therefore, no attempt was or will hereafter be
made to cite all publications.
38 See, e.g., Gilreath v. Southern Ry., 323 F.2d 158, 162 n. 4 (6th Cir. 1963).
39405 F.2d 1061 (4th Cir. 1969).
40 d. at 1066.
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that the federal judiciary has the power to reach that result which ap-
peals to it as just regardless of what the state may say-would dictate
a disregard of state standards in determining the sufficiency of a liti-
gant's evidence. However, Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins and its
progeny have cast grave doubt as to the propriety of applying a federal
standard.
It must be remembered that whether the evidence is sufficient for jury
submission is quite another matter from whether a disputed question
of fact should be tried before the judge or to a jury. To test the suf-
ficiency of the evidence is to decide or determine whether there is a
disputed question of fact. If, indeed, there is found to be a disputed
question of fact, Byrd and Simler demand that the question be submitted
to a jury for resolution. However, these cases are by no means de-
terminative in deciding whether a federal or state standard should ap-
ply to resolve whether or not there is a disputed question of fact.
Herron v. Southern Pacific Co.,41 a pre-Erie decision, held that the
distribution of functions between judge and jury was a matter gov-
erned by the seventh amendment, unaffected by a state constitutional
provision denying the right to take from the jury the issue of con-
tributory negligence. There was significant doubt as to the weight
which should be attributed Herron after Erie Railroad Co. v. Tomp-
kins. Such doubt was resolved, however, when the Court in Byrd
quoted from and relied upon the authority of Herron.
The Herron decision is precisely the converse of Simler and Byrd
Herron holds that when there is no disputed question of fact, a verdict
shall be directed irrespective of state law to the contrary, while Simler
and Byrd hold that where there is a disputed question of fact, there
will be jury submission, irrespective of state law to the contrary.
As stated by the Court in Byrd, the fact that a jury rather than a
judge will decide a disputed question of fact does not produce a strong
likelihood of a different result in the litigation. There will always be
a decision, whether by judge or jury, on the relative merits of any
disputed question of fact. However, at first glance, it appears that the
Herron decision would tend to produce the strong likelihood of a
different result on the same set of facts in a federal court as opposed to
a state court. Although the state court of Arizona could not direct a
verdict, it could have set aside an unreasonable verdict. If the direction
of a verdict would produce the same result as the setting aside of an un-
reasonable verdict, the same result would be reached in both the federal
41283 U.S. 91 (1931).
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and state courts, thereby satisfying the "outcome-determinative" re-
quirement.42 Difficulty arises here, however, when there is no limitation
placed upon the number of new trials or the result of a third trial will
convert, as a matter of law, an unreasonable verdict into one of reason.
It has been suggested with great logic that no principle, standard or
rule governing the creation of a right-duty relationship can ever be estab-
lished by such a procedure. "The most that can be said is that the
statute changes the allocation of functions between judge and jury....
[T] he considerations against the extraterritorial application of the legis-
lation are obviously almost overwhelming; and certainly there is
nothing.., to require the federal judges to go through two useless trials
in order to give a party the possible opportunity of persuading a third
jury to set up a special standard of conduct and logic for his case." 43
In the post-Erie decision of Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co.,44 the
Court held that the federal court was bound by state court decisions
which undertook to determine the sufficiency of the evidence to prove
total disability. This case was not tried before a jury and it is not de-
terminative of the question as to whether a state or federal standard ap-
plies in determining the sufficiency of evidence. 45 It is, however, some
indication of the philosophy of federal jurisprudence at the time of
decision.
If the Herron case were to come before the Court today, there is little
room for argument as to its probable outcome. The Arizona constitu-
tional provision requiring submission of the issue of contributory negli-
gence to the jury, regardless of the evidence, if given effect in a federal
diversity trial, would have the singular effect of removing rule 50 from
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Federal policy has been announced
by Congress and the Supreme Court favoring the right of the trial judge
to direct a verdict and no state law will be allowed to change the nature
of the trial judge's duty. Perhaps the opinion would again pronounce
the balancing theory expressed in Byrd and conclude that the federal
interest-that right of the federal court to withhold jury submission when
in the opinion of the court the evidence considered is a question of law-
outweighs the desire for uniformity in decisions within the state. The
opinion would probably add that the probability of difference in result
was remote, thereby satisfying the "outcome-determinative" policy.
42 See Note, State Trial Procedure and the Federal Courts: Evidence, Juries and
Directed Verdicts Under the Erie Doctrine, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1516, 1524-25 (1953).
43 Morgan, Choice of Law Governing Proof, 58 HARv. L. Rxv. 153, 179-80 (1944).
44 311 U.S. 464 (1940).45 See note 34 supra.
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The right of the federal court to withhold jury submission is not af-
fected by the choice of standard to be applied. The effect of rule 50
remains regardless of whether the choice of standard is in favor of the
state or federal law. Therefore, the obvious objection to the use of a
state standard found in Herron is not present. The only federal policy
consideration in favor of the use of a federal standard is the preservation
of consistency within the federal system in application of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Bound up in such a consideration is a desire
for a proper distribution of functions between judge and jury.
A survey of those cases decided since Erie does not disclose any ra-
tional mandate for applying a federal standard rather than the state
standard to determine the sufficiency of evidence. Because of the
desire to prevent forum-shopping as it existed under the doctrine of
Swift v. Tyson, it was stated that federal policy demanded the ap-
plication of state law to matters of substance. Federal policy also de-
manded that if disregard of state law would materially affect the out-
come of the litigation so as to produce the likelihood of a different
result, state law should apply. If indeed these statements of federal
policy are still true, it is difficult to see how anything other than a
state standard should determine when evidence is sufficient to tend to
prove the fact alleged.
Perhaps the thoughts expressed in Hanna v. Plumer are a true state-
ment of current federal policy. If so, then "outcome-determinative"
cannot be considered alone but must be weighed against the aims of
the Erie doctrine to discourage forum-shopping and to achieve uni-
formity in decisions within the state. If it be found that either or both
of the aims of the Erie doctrine will not be disturbed, then the fed-
eral law will apply, even if it may be said that to disregard the state
law would in some way affect the ultimate outcome of the case. To
determine whether the difference in result that might occur by dis-
regarding the state law is really of importance, the inquiry can easily
be made into whether such a difference would have encouraged forum-
shopping at the commencement of the litigation. As stated by the Court
in Hanna, the thought could not be seriously entertained "that one
suing an estate would be led to choose the federal court because of a
belief that adherence to rule 4(d) (1) is less likely to give the executor
actual notice than § 9 (the Massachusetts law), and, therefore, more
lilcely to produce a default judgment." 46
40 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460,469 n. 11 (1965).
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Because there is no federal general common law,47 each suit brought
iti the federal court on the jurisdictional ground of diversity of citizen-
ship must be decided by reference to state law. When the state makes
available the remedy that a litigant attempts to perfect, the law of
the state should determine the quantum of proof necessary for perfec-
tion. It is quite meaningless for the state merely to declare that a
litigant must prove a certain legal principle without also defining the
legal standards to measure the quality of the proof to create a question
of fact. Indeed, if the state defines the permissible inferences to be
drawn from a given state of facts, it is in the same breath defining the
substantive rule of law applicable to those facts. Such a definition
should be included in the remedy upon which the litigant bases his
claim.
Should it be decided that the appropriate standard is federal rather
than state, the number of cases affected will be quite smaller than
those affected under the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson. However, to that
class of cases, all of the objections to Swift v. Tyson sought to be
remedied by Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins will return and indeed
probably have returned in those circuits which follow the federal
standard. It can be expected that a litigant will accomplish the nec-
essary legal maneuverings to avail himself of the federal standard, if
indeed the accident of diversity was not present when the cause of
action arose. Certainly, the federal courts will swell with litigants,
emulating Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., anxious to obtain
a result different from their next door neighbor whose case was tried
on the same evidence in the state court. If the federal standard pro-
duces an issue of fact rather than an issue of law, or an issue of law
rather than one of fact, there is a strong likelihood that the very dis-
crimination sought to be avoided in York would continue. By having
his case tried in the federal court "one block away" from the state
court, the litigant would achieve a strong likelihood of a different result
than if he had proceeded in the state court.
If the federal policy today is that which prompted the reversal of
Swift v. Tyson, the state standard should be applied to determine the
sufficiency of the evidence. For the class of cases affected, that is the
only way to accomplish the desired result of discouraging forum-shop-
ping and achieving uniformity in decisions within the state. If, how-
ever, a federal standard is applied irrespective of a different state stan-
47 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
DIRECTED VERDICT
<lard, it is contended that for that class of cases affected, the philosophy
of federal jurisprudence announced in Swift v. Tyson and its progeny
with all of its 'mischievous results" "I has returned.
48 Id. at 74.
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